Cebolla: Pragmatic IP Anonymity
Brown, Z.: Cebolla: Pragmatic IP Anonymity. “Ottowa Linux Symposium”, czerwiec 2002.
Cebolla is an intersection of cryptographic mix networks and the environment of the public Internet. Most of the history of cryptographic mix networks lies in academic attempts to provide anonymity of various sorts to the users of the networks. While based on strong cryptographic principles, most attempts have failed to address properties of the public network and the reasonable expectations of most of its users. Cebolla attempts to address this gulf between the interesting research aspects of IP level anonymity and the operational expectations of most uses of the IP network.
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Cebolla Pragmatic IP Anonymity.pdf
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Chord: A Scalable Peer-to-peer Lookup Service for Internet Applications
Stoica, I., Morris, R., Karger, D., Frans Kaashoek, M., Balakrishnan, H.: Chord: A Scalable Peer-to-peer Lookup Service for Internet Applications. "SIGCOMM’01", sierpień 2001.
A fundamental problem that confronts peer-to-peer applications is
to efficiently locate the node that stores a particular data item. This
paper presents Chord, a distributed lookup protocol that addresses
this problem. Chord provides support for just one operation: given
a key, it maps the key onto a node. Data location can be easily
implemented on top of Chord by associating a key with each data
item, and storing the key/data item pair at the node to which the
key maps. Chord adapts efficiently as nodes join and leave the
system, and can answer queries even if the system is continuously
changing. Results from theoretical analysis, simulations, and experiments
show that Chord is scalable, with communication cost
and the state maintained by each node scaling logarithmically with
the number of Chord nodes.
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Chord A scalable peer-to-peer lookup service for internet applications.pdf
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Crowds: Anonymity for Web Transactions
Reiter, M., K., Rubin, A., D.: Crowds: Anonymity for Web Transactions. “ACM Transactions on Information and System Security 1(1)”, czerwiec 1998.
In this paper we introduce a system called Crowds for protecting users' anonymity on the world-wide-web. Crowds, named for the notion of \blending into a crowd", operates by grouping users into a large and geographically diverse group (crowd that collectively issues requests on behalf of its members. Web servers are unable to learn the true source of a request because it is equally likely to have originated from any member of the crowd, and even collaborating crowd members cannot distinguish the originator of a request from a member who is merely forwarding the request on behalf of another. We describe the design, implementation, security, performance, and scalability of our system. Our security analysis introduces degrees of anonymity as an important tool for describing and proving anonymity properties.
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Crowds Anonymity for Web Transactions.pdf
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Freenet: A Distributed Anonymous Information Storage and Retrieval System
Clarke, I., Sandberg, O., Wiley, B., Hong, T. W.: Freenet: A Distributed Anonymous Information Storage and Retrieval System, “In Proc. of the Workshop on Design Issues in Anonymity and Unobservability”, Berkeley, CA, lipiec 2000.
We describe Freenet, an adaptive peer-to-peer network application that permits the publication, replication, and retrieval of data while protecting the anonymity of both authors and readers. Freenet operates as a network of identical nodes that collectively pool their storage space to store data files and cooperate to route requests to the most likely physical location of data. No broadcast search or centralized location index is employed. Files are referred to in a location-independent manner, and are dynamically replicated in locations near requestors and deleted from locations where there is no interest. It is infeasible to discover the true origin or destination of a file passing through the network, and difficult for a node operator to determine or be held responsible for the actual physical contents of her own node.
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Freenet A Distributed Anonymous Information Storage and Retrieval System.pdf
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Introducing MorphMix: Peer-to-Peer based Anonymous Internet Usage with Collusion Detection
Rennhard, M., Plattner, B.: Introducing MorphMix: Peer-to-Peer based Anonymous Internet Usage with Collusion Detection. "WPES’02", listopad 2002.
Traditional mix-based systems are composed of a small set of static, well known, and highly reliable mixes. To resist traffic analysis attacks at a mix, cover traffic must be used, which results in significant bandwidth overhead. End-to-end traffic analysis attacks are even more difficult to counter because there are only a few entry- and exit-points in the system. Static mix networks also suffer from scalability problems and in several countries, instituations operating a mix could be targeted by legal attacks. In this paper, we introduce MorphMix, a system for peer-to-peer based anonymous Internet usage. Each MorphMix node is a mix and anyone can easily join the system. We believe that MorphMix overcomes or reduces several drawbacks of static mix networks. In particular, we argue that our approach offers good protection from traffic analysis attacks without employing cover traffic. But MorphMix also introduces new challenges. One is that an adversary can easily operate several malicious nodes in the system and try to break the anonymity of legitimate users by getting full control over their anonymous paths. To counter this attack, we have developed a collusion detection mechanism, which allows to identify compromised paths with high probability before they are being used.
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Introducing MorphMix Peer-to-Peer based Anonymous Internet Usage with Collusion Detection.pdf
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Introducing Tarzan, a Peer-to-Peer Anonymizing Network Layer
Freedman, M., J., Sit, E., Cates, J., Morris, R.: Introducing Tarzan, a Peer-to-Peer Anonymizing Network Layer. “9th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS 2002)”, Washington, D.C., październik 2002.
We introduce Tarzan, a peer-to-peer anonymous network layer that provides generic IP forwarding. Unlike prior anonymizing layers, Tarzan is flexible, transparent, decentralized, and highly scalable. Tarzan achieves these properties by building anonymous IP tunnels between an open-ended set of peers. Tarzan can provide anonymity to existing applications, such as web browsing and file sharing,
without change to those applications. Performance tests show that Tarzan imposes minimal overhead over a corresponding non-anonymous overlay route.
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Introducing Tarzan, a Peer-to-Peer Anonymizing Network Layer.pdf
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Mixmaster Protocol — Version 2
Moller, U., Cottrell, L., Palfrader, P., Sasseman, L.: Mixmaster Protocol — Version 2. Draft, czerwiec 2003.
Most e-mail security protocols only protect the message body, leaving useful information such as the the identities of the conversing parties, sizes of messages and frequency of message exchange open to adversaries. This document describes Mixmaster (version 2), a mail transfer protocol designed to protect electronic mail against traffic analysis. Mixmaster is based on D. Chaum's mix-net protocol. A mix (remailer) is a service that forwards messages, using public key cryptography to hide the correlation between its inputs and outputs. Sending messages through sequences of remailers achieves anonymity and unobservability of communications against a powerful adversary.
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Mixmaster Protocol Version 2.txt
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MorphMix: Peer-to-Peer based Anonymous Internet Usage with Collusion Detection
Rennhard, M.: MorphMix: Peer-to-Peer based Anonymous Internet Usage with Collusion Detection. “Technical Report TIK-Nr. 147”, sierpień 2002.
Several MIX-based systems offering anonymity have been operational. They are usually based on a relatively small set of static, well known and highly reliable nodes with good performance and connectivity that offer the MIX functionality. Due to the small number of nodes in such a system, they must be made very resistant against traffic analysis attacks by exchanging lots of cover traffic, resulting in an unacceptable bandwidth overhead. End-to-end traffic analysis attacks are even more difficult to counter as there are only a few entry- and exit-points in the system. Additionally, static MIX-networks suffer from scalability problems and in several countries, institutions operating a MIX could be targeted by legal attacks. In this technical report, we introduce MorphMix, a system for peer-to-peer based anonymous Internet usage. Each MorphMix node is a MIX in the system and anyone with access to a computer connected to the Internet with a public IP address can join the system. We believe that MorphMix overcomes or reduces several drawbacks of static MIX networks. On the other hand, MorphMix introduces new challenges. Particularly, an adversary can easily operate several malicious nodes in the system and try to break the anonymity of a legitimate user by getting full control over an anonymous path she is using. To counter this attack, we have
developed a collusion detection mechanism, which allows to identify compromised paths with a very high probability before they are being used.
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MorphMix Peer-to-Peer based Anonymous Internet Usage with Collusion Detection.pdf
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Tor: The Second-Generation Onion Router
Dingledine, R., Mathewson, N., Syverson, P.: Tor: The Second-Generation Onion Router, “13th USENIX Security Symposium”, sierpień 2004.
We present Tor, a circuit-based low-latency anonymous communication service. This second-generation Onion Routing system addresses limitations in the original design by adding perfect forward secrecy, congestion control, directory servers, integrity checking, configurable exit policies, and a practical design for location-hidden services via rendezvous points. Tor works on the real-world Internet, requires no special privileges or kernel modifications, requires little synchronization or coordination between nodes, and provides a reasonable tradeoff between anonymity, usability, and efficiency. We briefly describe our experiences with an international network of more than 30 nodes. We close with a list of open problems in anonymous communication.
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Tor The Second-Generation Onion Router.pdf
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Wszechstronna anonimowość klienta HTTP
Margasiński, I., Szczypiorski, K.: Wszechstronna anonimowość klienta HTTP. „19th
National Telecommunications Symposium – KST”, Bydgoszcz, wrzesień 2003.
W artykule przedstawiono metodę zapewnienia anonimowości dla użytkowników systemu WWW – VAST (Versatile Anonymous SysTem for Web Users). Zaproponowana nowa metoda niweluje ograniczenia występujące w istniejących systemach zapewniania anonimowości, jednocześnie oferując użytkownikom wszechstronną anonimowość względem wszystkich stron biorących udział w wymianie danych opartej na WWW. Nowatorskie rozwiązanie polega głównie na specyficznym wykorzystaniu generacji ruchu nadmiarowego. W artykule przedstawiono zarys implementacji metody w języku Java.
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Wszechstronna anonimowość klienta HTTP.pdf
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